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artificial intelligence in health care
APPLICATIONS AND LEGAL ISSUES

by w. nicholson price ii

a

rtiicial intelligence (AI) is rapidly
moving to change the healthcare system. Driven by the juxtaposition of
big data and powerful machine learning
techniques—terms I will explain momentarily—innovators have begun to develop
tools to improve the process of clinical
care, to advance medical research, and
to improve eiciency. hese tools rely on
algorithms, programs created from healthcare data that can make predictions or
recommendations. However, the algorithms themselves are oten too complex
for their reasoning to be understood or
even stated explicitly. Such algorithms may
be best described as “black-box.”1 his
article briely describes the concept of AI
in medicine, including several possible
applications, then considers its legal implications in four areas of law: regulation,
tort, intellectual property, and privacy.
AI in Medicine
Medicine, like many other ields, is experiencing a conluence of two recent
developments: the rise of big data, and the
growth of sophisticated machine learning/AI techniques that can be used to
ind complex patterns in those data. Big
data as a phenomenon is characterized
by the “three Vs” of volume (large quantities of data), variety (heterogeneity in
the data), and velocity (fast access to the
data). In medicine, the data come from
many sources: electronic health records,
medical literature, clinical trials, insurance
claims data, pharmacy records, and even
information entered by patients into their
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smartphones or recorded on itness trackers. Machine learning techniques, a subset
of AI, use simple learning rules and iterative techniques to ind and use patterns
in these vast amounts of data. he resulting algorithms can make predictions and
group sets—how long is a patient expected
to live given his collection of symptoms,
and does that picture of a patch of skin
look like a benign or a cancerous lesion?—
but typically, these techniques cannot
explain why or how they reach the conclusion they do. Either they cannot explain
it at all, or they can give explanations that
are accurate but meaningless in terms of
medical understanding.2 Because of this
inherent opacity (which might or might
not be augmented with deliberate secrecy
about how the algorithms were developed and validated), I describe this ield
as to “black-box medicine,” though it has
also been referred to as AI in medicine or
“predictive analytics.”3 To add to the complexity, when more data are available for
the machine learning algorithms, those
data can be incorporated to reine future
predictions, as well as to change the algorithms themselves. he algorithms at the
heart of black-box medicine, then, are not
only opaque but also likely to change over
time.
Black-box medicine has tremendous
potential for use throughout the healthcare system, including in prognostics,
diagnostics, image analysis, resource allocation, and treatment recommendations.
Machine learning is most familiar in the
context of image recognition, and an algorithm has already been developed that can
identify skin cancer by analyzing images
of skin lesions; the algorithm performs as
well as board-certiied dermatologists.4 A
recent New England Journal of Medicine
article suggests that such algorithms could
soon enter widespread use in image analysis, aiding or displacing much of the work

of anatomical pathologists or radiologists
within the span of years.5 Another current algorithm can predict which trauma
victims are likely to hemorrhage by constantly analyzing vital signs and can in
turn call for intervention to forestall catastrophe; such prognostic algorithms could
come into use in a similarly short time
frame.6 A bit farther of, black-box algorithms could be used for diagnosis more
generally, to recommend of-label uses for
existing drugs, to allocate scarce resources
to patients most likely to beneit from
them, to detect fraud or problematic medical behavior, or to guide research into
new diseases or conditions. In fact, blackbox algorithms are already in use today
in smartphone apps that aim to identify
developmental disorders in infants based
on facial features7 or autism in young children based on eye movement tracking.8
he potential for beneit from such blackbox medicine is substantial, but it comes
with its own challenges: scientiic and
medical, certainly, but also legal. How do
we ensure that black-box medicine is safe
and efective, how do we ensure its eicient development and deployment, and
how do we protect patients and patient
privacy throughout the process?
Regulation
he irst question to ask is perhaps the
most fundamental: How do we ensure that
black-box algorithms are high quality—
that is, that they do what they say, and that
they do it well and safely? New and emerging medical technologies and devices are
typically regulated for safety and eicacy
by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Whether the FDA actually has
statutory authority over free-standing
algorithms used to make medical decisions (or to help make them) depends on
the relatively complex question of what is
a “medical device.” he FDA’s regulation
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of black-box medical algorithms may
also conlict with its long-standing statement that it does not regulate the practice
of medicine.9 Elsewhere, I argue that the
FDA has this authority, probably over
algorithms standing alone and almost certainly in the context of linked technology
that may more readily be called a “medical device,” but disputes may arise over
this point.10 Industry dynamics may also
play a role here: Silicon Valley, the hub of
much of the innovation in AI generally,
traditionally has not worked closely with
regulators like the FDA.
Assuming that the FDA can and will
regulate AI in the healthcare system
(and the agency has asserted this ability and intent),11 typically two tools help
ensure safety and eicacy of new medical technology: scientiic understanding
and clinical trials. Unfortunately, these
two tools do not work well in the context
of black-box medicine. Understanding
does not work for obvious reasons—
we do not understand how a black-box
algorithm makes decisions, because the
machine learning techniques generally
cannot tell us their reasoning, and even
when they can, the results are oten too
complex to understand. Using clinical
trials for testing safety, eicacy, and validity might work for some algorithms, but
will not work for many others. For algorithms that divide patients into groups
and suggest a particular treatment, clinical trials could be used to test their
eicacy. But some algorithms will make
highly personalized treatment predictions or recommendations, so that the
use of clinical trials would be infeasible.
And even for algorithms that are amenable to trials, the beneits of black-box
medicine—quick, cheap shortcuts to
otherwise inaccessible medical knowledge—would be seriously delayed or
even curtailed due to the slow, ponderous, expensive enterprise of clinical trials.
For algorithms that change as they incorporate more data, the challenges are even
more pronounced. In short, in black-box
medicine, traditional methods of testing
new medical technologies and devices are
likely not to work at all in some instances,
and to slow or stile innovation in others.
So how should the FDA tackle this
challenge? he most fruitful path, I
argue, will likely be more lexible than

rigid, involving somewhat lighter premarket scrutiny (focused on procedural
safeguards like the quality of the data
used, the development techniques, and
the validation procedures) coupled with
robust post-market oversight as these
algorithms enter into clinical care. he
FDA has recently expressed interest in
this approach.12 Of course, this is easier said than done; the parallel case of
post-market surveillance for drugs is
notoriously troublesome to implement.
One attractive possibility would be for
the FDA to enable oversight help from
other sophisticated healthcare entities by
collaborating with them and, crucially,
enabling ways to get them important
and useful information. Hospitals, insurance companies, and physician specialty
associations all have an interest in ensuring that black-box algorithms actually
work to help patients (and, potentially,
their bottom lines). Rival developers may
also have an interest, especially in inding problems with existing algorithms.
In addition, these sophisticated entities
may have the capacity to perform evaluations, especially as they are used in
clinical practice, and to generate performance data. Nevertheless, performing
this type of collaborative governance role
requires information, and many algorithm developers are reluctant to share
that kind of information with any other
entities. Potentially the FDA could serve
as a centralized information-sharing role
to allow those other entities to play their
part in regulating black-box medicine.
However, exactly how this idea might
become a reality is very much an unresolved question.
Tort
What do we do when black-box medicine goes awry? he law of tort interacts
with black-box medicine in a few diferent
contexts. First, if there are laws built into
the algorithms themselves, or if regulation
fails to ensure that algorithms are high
quality, then the developers of algorithms
(or technologies that rely on them)
might become liable under tort law.
However, courts have been reluctant
to extend or apply product liability theories to sotware developers,
and even more reluctant in the
context of healthcare sotware.13
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Part of that reluctance has come from the
fact that healthcare sotware to date has
been characterized primarily as technology that helps healthcare providers make
decisions by providing them with information or analysis, with the inal decision
always resting in the hands of the provider.
Black-box medicine turns that notion on
its head, or at least it can. Can and should
healthcare providers be fully responsible for decisions suggested or made by
black-box algorithms that they do not, or
cannot, understand?
his raises a second set of questions.
What must healthcare providers and
healthcare institutions—doctors, nurses,
hospitals, managed-care organizations,
and the like—do to fulill their duties
of care to patients in a healthcare world
with black-box algorithms? Must providers themselves evaluate the quality of
black-box algorithms, based on procedural measures (validation undertaken,
performance statistics, etc.) before relying on those algorithms in the course of
providing care? And should healthcare
institutions perform similar evaluations
before implementing black-box sotware?
I argue elsewhere that they should, but
currently the information necessary for
that type of evaluation is largely unavailable—just as in the parallel regulatory
context mentioned above.14 Similarly, if an
algorithm suggests an intervention that
seems mundane but unhelpful, useless
and expensive, or dangerous, should the
provider second-guess the recommendation? On the one hand, the answer seems
an obvious “yes”—providers are trained to
care for patients—but on the other hand,
if providers only implement those decisions they would have reached on their
own, they will leave on the table much of
the beneit that black-box medicine promises to extract from otherwise inaccessible
patterns in big data. his would not leave
everything on the table—algorithms can
still potentially perform the usual analyses
more quickly and cheaply15—but excessive
caution is not costless. Courts have not
tackled these issues yet, but they will need
to in the near future.
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property protection creates
another set of challenges for the development of black-box medicine.16 When
12
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irms invest in developing black-box
algorithms, how can they protect that
investment? Developing black-box algorithms can involve considerable expense.
Developers must generate, assemble, or
acquire the tremendous data sets needed
to train their algorithms; they must assemble the expertise and resources to actually
develop those algorithms; and they must
validate them to make sure they work.
Normally, we might expect intellectual
property to provide some measure of protection for the information goods created
by such expenditures, so that irms are
willing to invest the necessary funds for
their development without fear that resulting inventions will be appropriated by
others.17 However, intellectual property its
relatively poorly for black-box medicine.
Patents are a natural choice to protect technological innovation, but patents
do not provide strong incentives for
black-box medicine. A string of recent
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreting section 101 of the Patent Act,
which governs patentable subject matter,
has made it very diicult to patent blackbox algorithms.18 In Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
the Supreme Court repeated its longstanding statement that laws of nature
cannot be patented.19 However, the Court
applied that rule to a diagnostic test that
used the measurement of a metabolite
level in a patient’s blood to adjust the dosage of a drug, which many, including the
Federal Circuit below, had thought to be
a patentable application of such a law. he
Supreme Court used very broad language
to invalidate the patent: “[W]ell-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by scientists who
work in the ield . . . is normally not suicient to transform an unpatentable law of
nature into a patent-eligible application
of such a law.”20 Where underlying information about the biological world is the
heart of the invention, merely using that
information to guide medical treatment
is unpatentable (as is the information
itself). But this describes most black-box
algorithms quite well and suggests that
those algorithms are unlikely to be patentable subject matter. Further patent
problems might arise under section 112,
which requires a “written description”
of the invention. Although this issue has

not been tested in the courts, it is at least
debatable how well one can describe an
algorithm that is opaque, and how broad
the resulting protection would be.21
Trade secrecy—or secrecy in general—
seems an obvious solution but comes with
its own problems. Trade secret law protects from appropriation information
that is kept secret and gets commercial
value from its secrecy. What better way
than secrecy to protect an algorithm that
is already opaque and cannot be understood? he data on which an algorithm
is generated, the method by which the
algorithm was developed, and the process of its validation can all be kept secret
by irms looking to protect their investment in the algorithm’s development. And
indeed, irms that are developing blackbox algorithms seem to be relying on just
such secrecy. But while secrecy may be
an efective intellectual property strategy,
it runs headlong into the concerns raised
above about safety, malpractice, and regulation. How willing will doctors, patients,
and insurers be to accept medical algorithms where not only is the working of
the algorithm a mystery, but also the way
the algorithm was made and tested, along
with the data underlying its development? And if third parties are indeed to
be actively involved in ensuring algorithmic quality and validity, as I suggest above,
how can they conduct such evaluations
without the underlying information? he
reliance of algorithm developers on trade
secrecy echoes other past situations where
information relevant to public health has
been kept secret, and these experiences
suggest that there may be similar ights
over access to algorithmic information.22
However, if intellectual property
incentives are unavailable to help protect investments in black-box medicine,
will irms invest suiciently? How can the
government help drive this form of innovation while ensuring that it is safe and
efective? hese questions are and will
remain pressing for the development of AI
in health care.
Privacy
Finally, privacy concerns run through the
development and deployment of blackbox medicine.23 Privacy is important in
at least two areas: gathering immense
amounts of healthcare data to develop
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algorithms, and sharing such data to oversee them. Algorithm developers need to
assemble data from multiple sources to
train machine learning algorithms. hose
data—as well as data about how the algorithms perform in practice—may then be
shared with other entities in the healthcare system for the purpose of evaluation
and validation, as described above. In
each case, patient-oriented data privacy
is a concern, most notably as mandated
under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA’s) Privacy Rule. he Privacy Rule governs and
restricts both disclosure and use of “protected health information” (that is, most
individually identiiable health information) by “covered entities” (mostly,
healthcare providers, health insurers,
health information clearinghouses, and
business associates of the same).24 HIPAA
creates a relatively complex set of permitted and restricted uses of protected health
information. Notably, de-identiied information is not governed by the Privacy
Rule (though it raises its own concerns
about data aggregation and the possibility
of re-identiication), and neither is information collected by noncovered entities
like Google, Apple, or other aggregators
of big data.25 Navigating the HIPAA Privacy Rule—and otherwise managing and
addressing the privacy concerns of those
whose data is used throughout black-box
medicine—creates yet another ongoing set
of potential legal concerns.
Conclusion
Black-box medicine has tremendous
potential to reshape health care, and it is
moving rapidly to do so. Some healthcare black-box algorithms are already at
work in consumer-directed smartphone
apps, and others are likely to enter medical
practice in the span of years. But the legal
issues involved with the development and
implementation of AI algorithms, which
we do not and cannot understand, are
substantial. As described here, regulation,
legal causes of action such as medical malpractice and product liability, intellectual
property, and patient privacy all have real
implications for the way black-box medicine is developed and deployed. In turn,
black-box medicine may change the way
we approach some of these issues in the
context of contemporary health care. Does

entity-centered privacy regulation make
sense in a world where giant data agglomerations are necessary and useful? Should
intellectual property law ind new ways
to recognize the primacy of health data
and the fast-moving nature of algorithms?
Must the legal doctrine of the “learned
intermediary” bow to the recognition that
doctors cannot fully understand all the
technologies they use or the choices such
technologies help them make when they
are not provided the needed and/or necessary information? Should the FDA change
how it regulates new medical technology as AI sotware gains prominence? As
black-box medicine develops and evolves,
the need to consider these legal issues—
and the need for scientiically literate
lawyers who can understand them in context—will continue to grow. u
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